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‘‘B
enefit-sharing’’ is a technical term that was popularized by the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which was adopted at the
1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This global convention
aims to achieve three objectives: the conservation of biological diversity, the
sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits
from the use of genetic resources.1 The CBD, with 191 state parties as of spring 2009,
was the first international treaty to recognize that the conservation of biodiversity
is a ‘‘common concern of humankind.’’2 Parties to the convention have pledged
to cooperate to stop the destruction of biodiversity by attempting to ensure its
sustainable use, and by requiring users of this natural wealth to share the benefits
with those who provide access to nonhuman biological resources.
This paper situates the CBD within long-standing debates on justice, and asks:
(a) What type of justice does the CBD demand with its principles? and (b) Can the
CBD be regarded as just (or equitable) legislation? First, we explain that nonhuman
biological resources can be viewed both as the common heritage of humankind
and as property falling under the sovereignty of states, groups, or individuals.
Second, we discuss whether the CBD is based on natural rights or alternative
foundations. Third, we outline the difference between distributive justice and
justice-in-exchange. Finally, we present our answers to the two questions posited
above.
Common Heritage of Humankind vs. National
Sovereignty
Who legally owns biological resources? For individual biological specimens, such as
particular trees or even whole forests, ownership follows the usual rules. Depending
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on the legal system and history of the relevant country, most nonhuman biological
resources are owned by private individuals, companies, traditional communities
with secure rights over their ancestral land, or the state. Some general characteristics
of biological species, by contrast, are considered to belong to humanity at large.
These characteristics prominently include plant DNA.
The idea of the common heritage of humankind explicitly entered the canon
of international law in the late twentieth century with the conclusion of two UN-
brokered international treaties: the Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979) and the Convention on the Law of
the Sea (1982). These treaties declare that the seabed, the ocean floor, the subsoil
thereof, as well as the surface and the subsurface of the moon shall not become the
property of any state, organization, or individual. The common heritage idea has
since been extended to certain biological resources, such as human DNA, which
are not governed by property ascriptions,3 and in 1995 were (along with human
body parts) specifically excluded from the CBD.4
But what does the common heritage principle mean? There are two conflicting
interpretations, exemplified respectively in the initial text (1982) and subsequent
revision (1994) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.5 One interpretation is
that our common human heritage must be used and enjoyed on terms that benefit
all. The other is that our common heritage is available to be used and exploited at
will on a first-come, first-served basis.
The former interpretation is suggested by some of the more lofty language of
the UN agreements and also expressed by the Human Genome Project’s Ethics
Committee in its Statement on Benefit Sharing (2000), which asserts that ‘‘the
human genome is part of the common heritage of humanity’’ and ‘‘[t]herefore, the
Human Genome Project should benefit all humanity.’’6 But the legal and practical
realities are often much closer to the latter interpretation, as has been observed by
(among others) the prominent Indian environmentalist Vandana Shiva:
The North has always used Third World germplasm as a freely available resource and
treated it as valueless. The advanced capitalist nations wish to retain free access to the
developing world’s storehouse of genetic diversity, while the South would like to have
the proprietary varieties of the North’s industry declared a similarly ‘‘public’’ good.7
Germplasm is the collection of genetic resources (DNA) of an organism. For
instance, the seeds of an artemisia plant would be called the plant’s germplasm.
Through its germplasm, the plant itself can be recreated or its properties can
be used, for instance, in developing malaria medication. Before the CBD was
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adopted, such genetic resources were assumed to be part of the common heritage
of humankind8—but in the sense of the second interpretation: they were not
protected through any demand that all of humanity must benefit from their
exploitation. For hundreds of years Northern plant specialists traveled to the South
and took germplasm without asking permission of, or sharing potential benefits
with, states or local communities. Some botanists and bioprospectors might have
given money to local farmers for local plants in recognition of private property
boundaries, but once the plant was obtained, its DNA was considered available for
private use. As a result of this free-for-all, those in the South today sometimes face
high barriers to access to goods based on the biodiversity of their own territories.
It matters greatly, then, how the common heritage idea is interpreted—
specifically, whether its implementation combines privileges and rights of
access with the obligation to share benefits, or instead simply allows private
appropriation by the fastest or strongest or best equipped, without any benefit-
sharing requirements. It is conduct of this latter kind that has led to the
denunciation of open access to biological resources, as the following pre-CBD
example illustrates.
The Merck Example
After obtaining a patent in 1991, Merck Pharmaceuticals started marketing a
treatment for glaucoma derived from a bush (jaborandi) found exclusively in
the Amazon region. The plant’s leaves are harvested by Indians in Brazil and
then transported to Germany, where its relevant parts (alkaloids) are refined and
transformed into eyedrops. If a Brazilian wanted to use the eyedrops, she would
have to buy them at German-set prices, and any Brazilian company wanting
to produce a generic version of the treatment would have to pay royalties to
Merck. Holmes Rolston succinctly outlines the tension: ‘‘Northern biotechnology
companies see this as a right to earnings on their investments. Southern nations
see this as more of the all-too-familiar exploitation.’’9
Following the adoption of the CBD, germplasm (such as that used by Merck
in the production of the glaucoma eyedrops) is no longer freely available to
all. According to the preamble of the CBD, nonhuman biological resources fall
under the national sovereignty of states. CBD proponents argued that this move
would help facilitate the resources’ sustainable use and preservation more than
the common heritage paradigm had in the past. They also claimed that this
would contribute to combating incidents of exploitation by imposing restrictions
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on access and setting requirements to share benefits with the providers of the
resources.
One may take it to be obvious that the CBD promotes justice, but this judgment
is controversial. As one observer has noted, ‘‘The international discourse on
benefit sharing (even within civil society organizations) is split into two antithetic
positions: While some people think that benefit sharing is possible and achievable,
others consider it as part of a Western paradigm of injustice—not possible and not
even desirable.’’ More dramatically, ‘‘The most sweeping biopiracy coup occurred
in 1993, when the CBD came into force and thereby legalized ‘recognition’ of
national sovereignty over genetic resources.’’10
Different Concepts of Justice
To assess these criticisms, we need to situate the CBD within current debates
about justice. Justice is a property that can be attributed to certain kinds of
judicanda11—primarily agents, actions, social rules/institutions, and states of
affairs. Let us apply this categorization to Merck’s glaucoma treatment as an
illustrative example. It was always true that the physical plant either belonged to
the Brazilian state or to local landowners. However, the tacit social rules prior to
the adoption of the CBD allowed that wild plants and germplasm belonged to the
public domain, and the plant type and its biochemical properties could therefore
be regarded as part of the common heritage of humankind, freely accessible to the
first comer without any benefit-sharing requirements. This rule enabled Merck
(the agent) to obtain valuable plant material in the Amazon and market a profitable
product without obtaining consent for access and without sharing benefits (the
action). At the same time, this tacit social rule led to a state of affairs, which Shiva
describes as exploitative and unjust.
As a result of lobbying by developing countries, the tacit rule was abandoned
and an explicit international legal rule was put in its place. Since 1992 wild plants
and germplasm have fallen under the sovereignty of individual states and are
thereby subject to access and benefit-sharing regulations. One could say that
bioprospectors who today disregard the CBD are unjust agents, committing unjust
actions, insofar as they violate a legitimate social rule set up to prevent exploitation
and injustice. Before the CBD came into effect, one could not make this claim
without contention. But there is also the deeper question of whether the CBD
itself accords with justice. Should the germplasm of biological species belong to
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the countries in which these species are native? Assessing the CBD’s assignment of
rights requires further reflection on the justification of social rules.
Natural Law vs. Social Utility
Human communities are organized by social rules, many of which are today
encoded in law and administered through courts. Social rules may be understood
in two main ways: they may reflect ultimate moral requirements, whether set down
by God or dictated by reason; or they may be understood as merely serving a
social purpose within human society. The constitutional rights of individuals are
typically understood in the first way, reflecting, as John Rawls says, a person’s
‘‘inviolability founded on justice which even the welfare of society as a whole
cannot override.’’12 The inviolability of these rights applies across the globe and
across time, and they are often referred to as natural rights.13 The right not to be
killed, suitably circumscribed (to allow for self-defense, say), is considered such a
right.14 Traffic rules, on the other hand, are typically understood in the second way,
in terms of their social utility as facilitators of efficient travel. Such social rules are
taken to be open to thoughtful revision toward preserving or enhancing their use-
fulness under changing conditions. By contrast, insofar as rules express natural-law
requirements, they are not thought to be revisable for the sake of social usefulness.
With regard to some social rules, their categorization into one of these two
types is contested. Thus, some argue that the social rule against torture is based on
expediency and may therefore be revised or abolished in changed circumstances,
whereas others present this rule as founded on a natural right.15 The social rules that
create and define property rights are subject to similar contention: some assume
that such rights should be designed to promote the common good, specified as
economic efficiency, say, or poverty avoidance.16 Others, following John Locke,
regard legal property rights as implementing preexisting natural rights to acquire
things and to dispose of them as one pleases.17 The two disputant groups may
entirely agree on what the rules should be and yet disagree sharply on their
justification. They agree then on what justice demands while disagreeing on why
justice demands it.
Intellectual Property Rights
The same disagreement exists with regard to intellectual property rights (IPRs),
which include the rights at stake in the CBD debate. Some hold that IPRs should
be shaped with an eye to the common good, striking the optimal balance between
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encouraging innovations and ensuring easy access to them. Others believe that
innovators have a natural right to control the use of their innovations. This
dispute was in evidence in the 1990s when affluent states successfully pressured
less developed states to accept the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which required
them to legislate for very extensive IPRs. Some argued that adopting U.S.-style
IPRs would benefit poor countries by making them more innovative. Others
argued that poor countries were morally required to adopt extensive IPRs in order
to suppress within their jurisdictions the natural-law crimes of ‘‘theft,’’ ‘‘piracy,’’
and ‘‘counterfeiting’’ that were being committed by copycat manufacturers.
We cannot thoroughly discuss this issue here, but we can offer three arguments
against the latter, natural-law understanding of IPRs. First, IPRs can be shaped in
myriad ways, each specifying differently their mode of acquisition, scope, or dura-
tion. None of these specifications is natural or obvious. And natural rights theorists
of IPRs disagree on which of these many specifications accords with natural law.
Second, like ordinary property rights, IPRs often clash with other important
rights, such as the right to life. One of the best examples of this tension can be
found in the area of access to lifesaving medication. The question, simply put,
is whether the creator of a lifesaving medicine should have the legal authority to
deny this medicine to those who cannot afford it, even if it is urgently needed to
halt a fast-spreading, deadly disease.
Third, IPRs are incompatible with the very natural-law understanding of
property rights adduced to support them. By asserting an IPR in some innovation,
the innovator claims not merely rights to the products she has made out of her
own materials, but also new property rights over materials owned by other people
who supposedly lose their freedom to convert their materials into products like the
one she had made. Such a deprivation of freedom conflicts with the natural-law
understanding of property rights in material things, which render owners immune
to unilateral expropriation by others. If the rights we have to use our material
property cannot be diminished by others without the owner’s consent, then there
can be no IPRs—that is, no restrictions an innovator can unilaterally impose on
what others may do with what they own. We see here that the common natural-
law understanding of physical property rights—far from showing the way to
an analogous natural-law understanding of IPRs—actually provides natural-law
grounds against IPRs.
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Could the claim that the genetic makeup of a wild plant growing in the Brazilian
Amazon belongs to the Brazilian state rather than, for instance, humankind
be based on natural law? Is there a natural right that requires that states be
assigned ownership of plant DNA? We have seen that natural rights theorists
run into serious difficulties justifying intellectual property rights. And the claim
that states hold a natural right of sovereignty over plant genetic resources is
even harder to justify. Many governments today are corrupt, brutally oppressive,
or both. Why should governments own the resources of the countries they
rule when for a considerable number of governments today the flourishing
of their citizens seems to be the least pressing concern? Why should human
flourishing be hampered through state property rights that potentially limit
benefits for humankind? If the earth were an island with plentiful resources
for its small number of roughly equally affluent citizens, it would not make
sense to restrict access to wild plants. Under such circumstances, no one would
object to a particularly inventive chap taking a plant and extracting its active
ingredients in order to create an anti-diabetes drink, even if he charged for the end
product.18
Social Utility
Neither mandated nor forbidden by natural law, the CBD framework should
be assessed by reference to the common good of humankind. In making this
assessment, one must consider the effects of the CBD relative to those of its
politically available alternatives. These effects depend on what the world is like: on
present facts about resources and scarcity as well as on the present international
economic order and distribution of wealth. Changes in the world may affect
whether the CBD rules are justified—for example, the rule that wild plants with
their DNA and other nonhuman biological resources fall under the sovereignty of
states.
It is difficult to estimate the relative effects of a set of social rules—that is, how
various relevant groups of people fare differently under these rules than they would
fare if other rules, or none, existed. Moreover, decisions about the design of social
rules are rarely such that one option is unambiguously worse than another—that
is, worse for some and better for none. In such cases, when no option clearly
dominates all others, a judgment of justice is required about which option best
serves social utility on the whole.
justice and the convention on biological diversity 273
Distributive Justice and Justice-in-Exchange
Distributive justice concerns the assessment of social rules and procedures that
regulate access to valued goods. Insofar as such rules and procedures are not
preempted by natural law, they ought to be designed to promote social utility,
or ‘‘the common good.’’ Such judgments, and the balancing of relative gains and
losses incurred by various affected groups, are controversial. Robin Hood might
say that a rule permitting involuntary redistribution of wealth from the rich to
the starving has high social utility: the protection it affords a disadvantaged group
outweighs the cost it imposes on the affluent. He might add that the rich are
already exploiting the poor as serfs on their land and therefore have contributed
to their starvation. By contrast, the Sheriff of Nottingham and English law impose
the same rules against theft upon poor and rich alike. In defense of his claim, the
sheriff would argue that human beings have a natural right to property, which
must not be violated. Or he would argue that a blanket prohibition on theft is for
the best even if it leads to the starvation of some.
This example illuminates two potential justice considerations. First, should
anybody ever starve while others have enough to avoid such starvation? This is a
distributive justice issue in a world of scarce resources that is characterized by vast
inequalities in wealth. Second, should serfs ever starve when they are working on
a landlord’s property? Do they not deserve rewards for their labor that suffice at
least to lift them to the level of subsistence? This, then, is a justice-in-exchange
issue. Essentially, justice-in-exchange regulates the justice of giving one thing and
receiving an appropriate return, while distributive justice deals with the division
of a jointly generated social product among qualifying participants.19
Justice-in-exchange mainly establishes the fairness of transactions. For instance,
is the rent charged for a particular flat in central London appropriate—in other
words, is it just? We are not using here the understanding of justice-in-exchange
based on Roman law, which only requires that two competent adults have
voluntarily agreed to a price. Rather, we are referring to the Aristotelian notion
of justice-in-exchange, which requires that a price and a good are proportionate
requitals—that is, that the intrinsic worth of a good is mirrored in a monetary
sum.20 On this understanding, a landlord can violate justice-in-exchange by
overcharging a tenant even if the tenant agrees to the charge.
Distributive justice, on the other hand, deals with access to scarce
resources—from the division of an apple pie among friends to the structure
of an economic order that regulates access to raw materials and the distribution
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of the jointly created social product. The further one moves away from individual
actions (such as sharing an apple pie) toward actions affecting large groups (all
those requiring tuberculosis treatment, for example), the more complex are the
social rules that come into play.
In the mid-twentieth century it appeared that there was some consensus, at
least within the West, on the essential question in distributive justice, namely:
Who deserves what from whom? European welfare-focused politicians and theorists
(henceforth ‘‘welfare liberals’’) agreed that (simply put) citizens and legitimate
residents (the who) qualify for income support at a subsistence level plus various
other basic social services (the what) from the state in which they reside (the from
whom).21 However, later in the century the proviso that the distributive justice
realm should align with national borders was questioned, and it is now increasingly
argued that distributive justice demands a universal, cosmopolitan response.22 This
understanding also seems to align with Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which reads:
Everyone [the who] has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control [the what].23
There may seem to be no practical disagreement about distributive justice
between the welfare liberal and the cosmopolitan. In response to the who question,
the cosmopolitan ascribes certain entitlements to everyone, while the welfare
liberal ascribes them to everyone who lives within a state. In the twenty-first
century, everyone is born into a state. Hence, the answers to the who question are
identical, for all practical purposes. There is also no difference in regard to the what
question, as welfare liberals and cosmopolitans tend to answer it with reference
to basic needs fulfillment, demanding that no human being should suffer violent
aggression for lack of protection (legal rights, police support, and so on) or die
prematurely from hunger, lack of shelter, or easily curable diseases.24
But the two approaches to distributive justice diverge with respect to the from
whom question. Welfare liberals require each state to be concerned with the basic
needs of its citizens only, while cosmopolitans typically argue that national borders
make no significant difference to questions of distributive justice and that any state
and its citizens should therefore be concerned with the needs of all human beings
worldwide.
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CBD Benefit-Sharing: Distributive Justice
or Justice-in-Exchange?
Let us recall the main principles of the CBD. First, the convention aims to improve
the conservation of biological diversity. It is one thing to look after a resource for the
benefit of humankind, and quite another to do so when one stands to gain the lion’s
share of the benefits oneself. By giving a large stake in the benefits that flow from
natural resources to their custodians, one may hope better to preserve our planet’s
biodiversity—for the benefit of human beings everywhere, present and future.
Second, the CBD aims to enable access to biodiversity for sustainable use, with the
emphasis on use. In the context of increasing criticism from developing countries
regarding the exploitation of their biological resources, it is much more likely that
access for use will be granted if developing countries’ concerns are satisfactorily
addressed through access and benefit-sharing agreements. Consequently, the third
principle of the CBD—the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from the use of
genetic resources—is instrumental in achieving the first two principles.
Drawing on our discussion of common heritage, national sovereignty, social
utility, and natural rights, as well as of distributive justice and justice-in-exchange,
we can now situate the CBD within two justice frameworks.
The famous neem tree case illustrates how the CBD relates to justice-in-
exchange. The neem tree’s medicinal properties have been known for thousands of
years in India, Sri Lanka, Burma, and elsewhere. Nonetheless, a patent was taken
out by an international agrochemical business (Monsanto) ignoring this prior
art and aiming for monopoly control.25 Led by Vandana Shiva, an international
lobbying movement managed to have the patent revoked after a legal battle of
nearly ten years.26
The CBD generalizes this result by creating justice-in-exchange requirements
that forbid conduct such as Monsanto’s use of a resource from a foreign country
for shareholder profit without rewarding local people for their contributions of
knowledge and husbandry. The CBD makes it illegal for outsiders unilaterally to
appropriate plants, animals, microorganisms, or traditional knowledge without
obtaining the consent of, and offering compensation to, the state from which these
resources are taken.27
By creating property rights where there were none before (in plant DNA,
for example), has the CBD been a significant step toward justice? One might
deny this by saying that humans should be ready to share their local knowledge
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and biodiversity free of charge for the greater health and well-being of people
everywhere. To appreciate this attitude, consider an analogous case involving
the authors of this paper (well-off academics in permanent posts) or many of
our readers. If we were asked by medical researchers for a blood sample that
might lead to some new (possibly patented) medical product or service, we would
probably comply and think no more of it. Though our contribution brings benefits
to others, we would not think ourselves unjustly treated if we were offered no
opportunity for benefit-sharing. This apparent altruism may be sustained in part
by our appreciation that we would have access to any benefits of the research,
and that we and our fellow citizens also derive indirect economic benefits from a
thriving high-tech industry focused on human health.28
But the issue looks very different when the medical research involves illiterate
participants from a poor country who naively show the same common-spiritedness
while perhaps even laboring under the misconception that they stand to benefit
from the study through new products that would be available and affordable to
them. Such research may well be exploitative.29 This is especially likely when the
intended product will be unavailable in, or unsuitable for, the country where the
research took place and when the research brings no significant indirect economic
benefits in that country. Under such circumstances, a compelling case can be made
for benefit-sharing as a requirement of justice. This analogy shows how context
matters. It matters for justice-in-exchange, as when the future availability of the
research products is reward enough for an affluent research participant—yet not
for a poor one, because these products will not be affordable to her or to her
friends, relatives, or most of her compatriots.
Context matters also for distributive justice, as is brought out by Bram de Jonge
and Michiel Korthals, who maintain that benefit-sharing
should not merely be seen as an instrument of compensation. . . . Instead, and in the
face of the harsh reality that more than 800 million people are undernourished, benefit
sharing should also . . . be a tool to improve food security.30
In this passage, de Jonge and Korthals invoke a harsh reality that is not restricted
to food security. While distributive justice as basic needs fulfillment has almost
been achieved in European-style welfare states, the situation in other parts of
the world is desperate. According to official statistics, of the world’s 6.7 billion
people over one billion are chronically undernourished, 884 million lack access to
safe water, and about 2 billion lack access to essential medicines.31 People living
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with such severe deprivations are particularly vulnerable to infectious diseases and
often unable to overcome them. Today, a third of all human deaths are from
poverty-related causes, including over 9 million deaths each year of children under
the age of five.32 This is the context in which developing country activists, such
as Shiva, Gurdial Singh Nijar, and Pat Mooney, have raised their concerns about
the unilateral and uncompensated appropriation by rich and powerful foreign
corporations of biological resources from poor areas of the globe.33 A requirement
to share some of the benefits of biodiversity is much more compelling in contexts
where it contributes to the fulfillment of basic needs and, hence, to the promotion
of distributive justice.
It is possible that the CBD will promote the fulfillment of basic needs and
thereby mitigate the great distributive injustice of existing global institutional
arrangements. But it affords at best a very partial remedy. Imagine two
communities, in different countries, whose members are undernourished and
lack safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, and access to essential medicines.
One community resides amid considerable biodiversity that is being used by a
pharmaceutical company and leads to a patent; the other does not. Pursuant to
the CBD, the company must compensate the first of the two communities for
its contribution to any patented product—thereby helping to meet its members’
basic needs. But the other community, gaining nothing from the CBD, would
remain in crisis. Thus, the CBD is no substitute for a more ambitious reform of
our global economic order that would realize social and economic human rights
worldwide. With such a reform in place, the CBD might well become obsolete.
Conclusion
When it comes to biological resources, be they blood samples or plants, the
ideal scenario would let them be freely accessible to be used for the benefit of
humankind without any inherent exploitation. Those who access resources would
share the resulting benefits equitably with others. Bureaucratic barriers to the use
of resources (other than for reasons of achieving sustainability) and requirements
of benefit-sharing would be counterproductive in a benign context resembling
the previously described island of affluent citizens who would have real access to
the fruits of innovation through the market.34 Free access to biological resources
would facilitate innovation enjoyed by all, much in the spirit of the common
heritage idea.
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Free access to biological diversity cannot be justified, however, in a context
of extreme economic inequality where appropriation by some (on a first-come,
first-served basis) will lead to innovations unavailable to the global poor. In such
a context, the CBD rightly favors national sovereignty over the common heritage
principle with regard to nonhuman biological resources. The CBD can be justified
as a contextual decision made at the end of the twentieth century, when biodiversity
was being rapidly depleted and developing countries were justifiably concerned
about the exploitation of their resources. While we agree that ideally the common
heritage principle is to be preferred over fencing in resources with bureaucratic
procedures, implementing this principle in the context of our severely unjust
international economic order would be excessively detrimental to the poor.35
The CBD therefore represents just legislation at the beginning of the twenty-first
century.36
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